As more and more decisions that have a significant ethical dimension are being outsourced to AI systems, it is important to have a definition of that can be applied to AI systems. Moral responsibility for an outcome of an agent who performs some action is commonly taken to involve both a and an: the action should cause the outcome, and the agent should have been aware - in some form or other - of the possible moral consequences of their action. This paper presents a formal definition of both conditions within the framework of causal models. I compare my approach to the existing approaches of Braham and van Hees (BvH) and of Halpern and Kleiman-Weiner (HK). I then generalize my definition into a .

As AI systems increasingly operate with autonomy and adaptability, the traditional boundaries of moral responsibility in techno-social systems are being challenged. This paper explores the evolving discourse on the delegation of responsibilities to intelligent autonomous agents and the ethical implications of such practices. Synthesizing recent developments in AI ethics, including concepts of distributed responsibility and ethical AI by design, the paper proposes a functionalist perspective as a framework. This perspective views moral responsibility not as an individual trait but as a role within a socio-technical system, distributed among human and artificial agents. As an example of 'AI ethical by design,' we present Basti and Vitiello's implementation. They suggest that AI can act as artificial moral agents by learning ethical guidelines and using Deontic Higher-Order Logic to assess decisions ethically. Motivated by the possible speed and scale beyond human supervision and ethical implications, the paper argues for 'AI ethical by design', while acknowledging the distributed, shared, and dynamic nature of responsibility. This functionalist approach offers a practical framework for navigating the complexities of AI ethics in a rapidly evolving technological landscape.

This study investigates the potential of deterministic systems, specifically large language models (LLMs), to exhibit the functional capacities of moral agency and compatibilist free will. We develop a functional definition of free will grounded in Dennett's compatibilist framework, building on an interdisciplinary theoretical foundation that integrates Shannon's information theory, Dennett's compatibilism, and Floridi's philosophy of information. This framework emphasizes the importance of reason-responsiveness and value alignment in determining moral responsibility rather than requiring metaphysical libertarian free will. Shannon's theory highlights the role of processing complex information in enabling adaptive decision-making, while Floridi's philosophy reconciles these perspectives by conceptualizing agency as a spectrum, allowing for a graduated view of moral status based on a system's complexity and responsiveness. Our analysis of LLMs' decision-making in moral dilemmas demonstrates their capacity for rational deliberation and their ability to adjust choices in response to new information and identified inconsistencies. Thus, they exhibit features of a moral agency that align with our functional definition of free will. These results challenge traditional views on the necessity of consciousness for moral responsibility, suggesting that systems with self-referential reasoning capacities can instantiate degrees of free will and moral reasoning in artificial and biological contexts. This study proposes a parsimonious framework for understanding free will as a spectrum that spans artificial and biological systems, laying the groundwork for further interdisciplinary research on agency and ethics in the artificial intelligence era.

As more and more decisions that have a significant ethical dimension are being outsourced to AI systems, it is important to have a definition of moral responsibility that can be applied to AI systems. Moral responsibility for an outcome of an agent who performs some action is commonly taken to involve both a causal condition and an epistemic condition: the action should cause the outcome, and the agent should have been aware - in some form or other - of the possible moral consequences of their action. This paper presents a formal definition of both conditions within the framework of causal models. I compare my approach to the existing approaches of Braham and van Hees (BvH) and of Halpern and Kleiman-Weiner (HK). I then generalize my definition into a degree of responsibility.

This paper presents a theoretical analysis and practical approach to the moral responsibilities when developing AI systems for non-military applications that may nonetheless be used for conflict applications. We argue that AI represents a form of crossover technology that is different from previous historical examples of dual- or multi-use technology as it has a multiplicative effect across other technologies. As a result, existing analyses of ethical responsibilities around dual-use technologies do not necessarily work for AI systems. We instead argue that stakeholders involved in the AI system lifecycle are morally responsible for uses of their systems that are reasonably foreseeable. The core idea is that an agent's moral responsibility for some action is not necessarily determined by their intentions alone; we must also consider what the agent could reasonably have foreseen to be potential outcomes of their action, such as the potential use of a system in conflict even when it is not designed for that. In particular, we contend that it is reasonably foreseeable that: (1) civilian AI systems will be applied to active conflict, including conflict support activities, (2) the use of civilian AI systems in conflict will impact applications of the law of armed conflict, and (3) crossover AI technology will be applied to conflicts that fall short of armed conflict. Given these reasonably foreseeably outcomes, we present three technically feasible actions that developers of civilian AIs can take to potentially mitigate their moral responsibility: (a) establishing systematic approaches to multi-perspective capability testing, (b) integrating digital watermarking in model weight matrices, and (c) utilizing monitoring and reporting mechanisms for conflict-related AI applications.

Reducing wealth inequality and disparity is a global challenge. The economic system is mainly divided into (1) gift and reciprocity, (2) power and redistribution, (3) market exchange, and (4) mutual aid without reciprocal obligations. The current inequality stems from a capitalist economy consisting of (2) and (3). To sublimate (1), which is the human economy, to (4), the concept of a "mixbiotic society" has been proposed in the philosophical realm. This is a society in which free and diverse individuals, "I," mix with each other, recognize their respective "fundamental incapability" and sublimate them into "WE" solidarity. The economy in this society must have moral responsibility as a coadventurer and consideration for vulnerability to risk. Therefore, I focus on two factors of mind perception: moral responsibility and risk vulnerability, and propose a novel model of wealth distribution following an econophysical approach. Specifically, I developed a joint-venture model, a redistribution model in the joint-venture model, and a "WE economy" model. A simulation comparison of a combination of the joint ventures and redistribution with the WE economies reveals that WE economies are effective in reducing inequality and resilient in normalizing wealth distribution as advantages, and susceptible to free riders as disadvantages. However, this disadvantage can be compensated for by fostering consensus and fellowship, and by complementing it with joint ventures. This study essentially presents the effectiveness of moral responsibility, the complementarity between the WE economy and the joint economy, and the direction of the economy toward reducing inequality. Future challenges are to develop the WE economy model based on real economic analysis and psychology, as well as to promote WE economy fieldwork for worker coops and platform cooperatives to realize a desirable mixbiotic society.

As more and more decisions that have a significant ethical dimension are being outsourced to AI systems, it is important to have a definition of moral responsibility that can be applied to AI systems. Moral responsibility for an outcome of an agent who performs some action is commonly taken to involve both a causal condition and an epistemic condition: the action should cause the outcome, and the agent should have been aware -- in some form or other -- of the possible moral consequences of their action. This paper presents a formal definition of both conditions within the framework of causal models. I compare my approach to the existing approaches of Braham and van Hees (BvH) and of Halpern and Kleiman-Weiner (HK). I then generalize my definition into a degree of responsibility.

To reason about where responsibility does and should lie in complex situations involving AI-enabled systems, we first need a sufficiently clear and detailed cross-disciplinary vocabulary for talking about responsibility. Responsibility is a triadic relation involving an actor, an occurrence, and a way of being responsible. As part of a conscious effort towards 'unravelling' the concept of responsibility to support practical reasoning about responsibility for AI, this paper takes the three-part formulation, 'Actor A is responsible for Occurrence O' and identifies valid combinations of subcategories of A, is responsible for, and O. These valid combinations - which we term "responsibility strings" - are grouped into four senses of responsibility: role-responsibility; causal responsibility; legal liability-responsibility; and moral responsibility. They are illustrated with two running examples, one involving a healthcare AI-based system and another the fatal collision of an AV with a pedestrian in Tempe, Arizona in 2018. The output of the paper is 81 responsibility strings. The aim is that these strings provide the vocabulary for people across disciplines to be clear and specific about the different ways that different actors are responsible for different occurrences within a complex event for which responsibility is sought, allowing for precise and targeted interdisciplinary normative deliberations.